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The term “modern production agriculture” requires constant redefining 
because our food and fiber system continues to develop and change.
Raymond Goldberg, head of the Agribusiness Program at the Harvard School 
of Business Administration, describes four factors that characterize the 
ongoing industrialization of agriculture:
The consolidation of firms at every stage of the food chain;
The coordination of the food system through long-term legal relationships;
The biotechnology revolution; and
The information revolution (Goldberg 1993).
These factors are contributing to the development of new, end-use oriented 
marketing systems that run alongside or, in other cases, displace traditional 
commodity systems. One such end-use oriented system is for products that 
derive from what are commonly known as “end-use tailored” or “identity- 
preserved” varieties. These varieties carry distinct traits that are preserved from 
the time of production through marketing to processing and consumption.1
Trying to describe identity-preserved systems in a single sentence, I came up 
with: The global coordination of research, development, production, processing and 
marketing of new animal breeds and plant varieties with special traits that fill a 
particular producer, processor or consumer need and which are protected by 
intellectual property rights.
1 Identity-preserved also refers to products produced according to a particular process, such as according 
to organic standards
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BiotechnologyandIdentityPreservedSystems
The life sciences, particularly biotechnology, will play a central role in the 
development of identity-preserved systems. Advances in physiology and 
classical and molecular genetics allow for the isolation, characterization and 
transfer of valuable traits. More generally, the majority of future productivity 
gains are expected to come from improved crop and livestock genetics.
Robert Fraley of Monsanto Company spoke at NABC 6 on the new products 
and industries that plant biotechnology will spawn (Fraley 1994). Many, if not 
all, of the new products for improved pest, disease and nutrient management; 
food processing; nutritional profiles; chemicals and polymers; and biofuels will 
be identity-preserved.
The technology behind identity-preserved systems will be consumer driven, 
not just in terms of the products, but in terms of the processes by which they 
are made. Speaking at NABC 6, R. James Cook, Chief Scientist at the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s National Research Initiative Competitive 
Grants Program, said: “The very use of molecular methods to produce disease 
and pest-resistant varieties of some fruits and vegetables is being driven by 
consumer demand” (Cook 1994). This is because consumers not only demand 
fruits and vegetables free of pesticide residues, they demand those varieties that 
allow for pesticide use reductions.
By responding to downstream demand, identity-preserved systems will more 
closely link producers to consumers and other end users. Thomas N. Urban, 
President and CEO of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., who has written and 
spoken on the implications of identity preservation, noted: “We are getting to 
the point where we can almost identify certain farmers with certain shelf space” 
(Urban 1993).
TheRoleofIntellectualPropertyinIdentityPreservedSystems
Intellectual property rights will be critically important in identity-preserved 
systems for livestock, field crop and horticultural varieties. This is because 
intellectual property rights ensure the preservation and control of the value- 
added factor through the food chain.
There are two basic ways that intellectual property rights maintain the 
identity and profitability of value-added proprietary factors of identity- 
preserved varieties. First of all, intellectual property rights reduce research 
and development investment risk. This holds true for all commercial products 
requiring substantial research and development outlays and is the basic policy 
rationale behind intellectual property laws. The biotechnology industry 
presents an extreme case in that it is more capital intensive than most 
and its products easily copied. Thus, plant breeders’ rights, trade secrets, 
trademarks and patents are particularly important in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry.
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Pioneer Hi-Bred Patent Counsel, Michael J. Roth, writes: . . we need more
protection for the fruits of our research than has traditionally been available . . . 
By providing a higher level of protection . . . patents help to insulate protected 
technology against risk, particularly that the technology will be copied by 
persons who have invested and risked nothing in its creation” (Roth 1994).
Second, intellectual property rights allow those who control the flow of 
value-added components in the food chain to obtain downstream premiums.
A quick look at the percentage of the consumer food dollar spent on upstream 
versus downstream added-value reveals that the lion’s share of profits in the 
food industry derive from downstream activities. For example, the annual retail 
market for fresh tomatoes in the U.S. is $3.5 billion versus a $300 million 
annual retail market for tomato seed.2
Identity-preserved products provide downstream added-value, for which 
the processor and consumer are willing to pay a premium. (Goldberg 1993). 
Identity-preserved products, separated from their cousins in traditional com-
modity markets and controlled by proprietary rights holders, will allow a 
greater portion of the downstream food dollar to flow to upstream actors.
In fact, actors at any point in food chain who obtain proprietary rights in 
identity-preserved technology can profit from interactions at points upstream 
or downstream. For example, consider the food processor that contracts out the 
production of its proprietary identity-preserved variety and then processes and 
markets an identity-preserved product under its brand name. It also may license 
out the same identity-preserved technology to upstream research firms.
The distribution of proprietary rights and royalties under these coordinated 
systems will depend on one’s position in the food chain—whether a university, 
biotechnology firm, producer, processor, packer, retailer, etc. Moreover, the 
development of a harmonized global intellectual property system as a result of 
recent changes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will 
facilitate these interactions on a global scale.
TheCalgeneFlavrSavU ™ TomatRAn  IdentityPreservedSystem
To illustrate these concepts, let us look at the most famous agricultural 
biotechnology product on the market today—the Calgene Flavr Savr™ tomato.
In 1984, Calgene, Inc. entered into an agreement with the Campbell Institute 
for Research to develop technology for production of premium vine-ripened 
tomatoes. According to the agreement, Calgene would obtain patents on any 
relevant isolated genes and Campbell Soup Company would receive an 
exclusive, worldwide license for their use.
2Calgene, Inc. 1995
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In February 1989, Calgene, was issued a U.S. patent on the tomato poly-
galacturonase gene sequence and the use of its antisense orientation. In April 
1992, the company was issued a broad process patent covering the use of 
antisense RNA technology in all plants. In 1991, Zeneca A.V.P., a subsidiary 
of ICI, Inc., filed and was granted an interference by the U.S. Patent Office 
between the 1989 Calgene patent and Zeneca’s 1986 patent application on 
a similar technology. All three companies entered into negotiations and in 
February 1994, a final distribution of rights was determined.
Campbell and Zeneca co-own exclusive rights to grow and use Flavr Savr™ 
technology for processed tomato products. Calgene Fresh owns exclusive, 
worldwide, royalty-free rights to produce and sell fresh market tomatoes 
containing the Flavr Savr™ gene.
Let us see how the Flavr Savr™ production, handling and marketing system 
places it outside the larger traditional commodity tomato system, commonly 
known as the “gas green” system.
FlavrSavU ™ orVineRipe ” System
Calgene, Inc. scientists engineered Flavr Savr™ technology into tomato 
varieties bred in the 1950s for superior taste, but which had fallen out of 
production because they were inappropriate for the gas-green system. Because 
the Flavr Savr™ tomato requires special growing, packing and transportation 
to preserve the vine-ripened taste and consistency factors, Calgene decided 
to manage the entire system.
Calgene Fresh, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Calgene, Inc., was formed in 
1992 to manage the Flavr Savr™ system. The company has entered into year- 
round production contracts with a number of growers in California and Florida, 
and expects to have growers soon in Mexico. Under the contracts, Flavr Savr™ 
growers do not take ownership of the seed or progeny tomatoes.
Contract growers must abide by a set of strict growing protocols that include 
integrated pest management and nutrient management techniques. The Flavr 
Savr™ technology allows the tomatoes to be picked ripe. Calgene Fresh sorts 
the tomatoes into three quality grade categories, the highest quality of which 
are designated for marketing under the brand name MacGregors®. Calgene 
contracts with shippers to transport MacGregors® tomatoes at temperatures 
above 50°F to supermarkets.
Calgene Fresh has developed its own marketing program for MacGregors® 
tomatoes that uses brand development and support techniques traditionally 
employed for processed and other branded food items. This involves the use 
of trained food brokers to sell and support the product in retail supermarkets. 
Each tomato carries a sticker denoting it as a product of genetic engineering 
and brochures on the product are available at the point of purchase.
90 Genes for the Future: Discovery, Ownership, Access
“GasGreenSystem
Most producers of fresh tomatoes in the “gas-green” system grow on contract 
for a packer/shipper. The varieties used were derived from publicly-released 
varieties developed for machine harvesting. These tomatoes are picked green 
and purchased by the packer/shipper, who sorts and packs them using special 
machinery. Prior to shipping, ethylene gas is applied to induce ripening. The 
tomatoes are sold to one or two repackers, who in turn sells to the retailer. 
These tomatoes are shipped at temperatures below 50°E More time is required 
to take the product to the consumer under the gas-green system because of the 
middlemen involved.
Comparing the two systems, we can readily see how MacGregors® tomatoes 
fit Goldberg’s description of identity-preserved systems: “The tailor-making of 
identity-preserved food products allows the input supplier to provide branded 
ingredients at the farm supply and farm level; these ingredients, in turn, enable 
both the branded food manufacturer and the private label food retailer ... to 
differentiate their final products to the consumer” (Goldberg 1993). Here,
Flavr Savr™ technology is supplied at the farm level and preserved for the 
consumer under the MacGregors® brand name. On the other hand, there is 
no value-added factor preserved from production to consumption in the gas 
green system and no identifiable relationship between growers and consumers.
IDENTITY-PRESERVED SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTION AGRICULTURE
The mechanism by which the identity-preserved system links producers to the 
rest of the food chain is the production contract. Contract production in the 
U.S. is by no means a new phenomenon. Integrated systems based on contract 
production have existed for some time in poultry, fruit and vegetables and are 
increasing in hogs where the percentage raised under contract has grown from 
two percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 1990 (Kelley 1994). It is predicted that 
an increasing percentage of these contracts will involve identity-preserved 
varieties. For instance, Thomas Urban expects nearly 25 percent of all corn 
grain production in the U.S. to be on an identity-preserved, contract basis by 
the year 2000 (Urban 1991).
Minneapolis attorney Christopher R. Kelley classifies production contracts 
(here, between producer and processor) into four categories:
Market specification contracts — set the price, quantity and quality of 
the product;
Production management contracts — give the processor direct control 
over production methods;
Resource-providing contracts — allow the processor to provide all or part 
of the inputs, incorporating strict quality standards throughout the 
production process; and
Lamola 91
Vertical integration contracts — completely shift production control to 
the processor, with the producer supplying only labor, land and other 
fixed inputs (Kelley 1994).
Production contracts involving protected identity-preserved varieties are 
licenses. Because such contracts license a specific quantity of the proprietary 
identity-preserved variety, they are called bailments.3 For example, the Flavr 
Savr™ contract producer takes possession of a fixed quantity but no property 
interest in Flavr Savr™ seeds or progeny. Therefore, as the number of identity- 
preserved systems involving proprietary varieties and special production 
practices increases, we would expect to see an increase in the last two 
types of contracts.
The primary advantage of contract production for both the producer and 
the contractor is risk management. By controlling the timing, quantity, quality 
and specifications of production, economic efficiencies may be realized. 
Coupled with long-term marketing arrangements, these factors can help 
promote stability. Contract production of identity preserved varieties may 
provide producers with better returns than those obtainable in traditional 
commodity markets. Thomas Urban writes, “As opposed to producing a 
commodity that is then transformed by some portion of the food chain, 
farmers themselves are going to receive a premium” (Urban 1993) for the 
identity-preserved factor. For example, I learned that retailers pay twice as 
much for the Flavr Savr™ tomato as for the gas-green tomato.
There are a number of factors that can impact a contract producer’s ability to 
obtain higher returns. In his book on production contracts, Drake University 
Law Professor Neil Hamilton discusses an important point about privately 
negotiated contract production systems — the loss of publicly discovered 
pricing mechanisms, so that the producer cannot learn the real market value 
of the products (Hamilton 1995).
Another factor influencing a producer’s return under a production contract 
is relative bargaining power. Recently, some contract producers have organized 
into associations to improve their bargaining position. Perhaps the most well 
known is the National Contract Poultry Growers Association, which has 
lobbied for state and federal legislation designed to prohibit unfair practices 
by integrators.
In an effort to improve returns over those available under contract pro-
duction alone, some producers have moved into value-adding, downstream 
activities, such as processing and marketing of identity-preserved varieties.
For proprietary varieties, this would necessitate a license to grow, process and 
sell products of the variety.
3The legal relationship created in the standard seed production contract is a bailment.
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An example of the above is the American White Wheat Producers Associa-
tion (AWWPA), a marketing cooperative of western and Midwestern wheat 
producers formed in 1988. AWWPA has exclusive licenses to grow, process 
and sell flour of two proprietary hard white wheat varieties. Members grow the 
varieties under contract with AWWPA, which retains marketing rights. AWWPA 
mills the wheat and sells flour to bakeries and processors. It has a trademark for 
its flour, which is displayed on wheat products. This eliminates a number of 
middlemen and has increased members’ profits (Burchett 1993).
Another option for producer groups is to obtain proprietary rights in or 
exclusive licenses to identity-preserved varieties through research agreements 
or other strategic alliances with the private or public sector. Alternatively, 
producer groups may contract for research services or establish their own 
private research institutes.4
Traditionally, producers have funded land-grant university research with 
grants from private commodity groups and with checkoff funds managed by 
marketing order boards. Until recently, technology developed using these 
funds was considered a public good and transferred to state industry by state 
extension services and experiment stations. Today, land-grant universities 
protect inventions with intellectual property rights, enter into research 
agreements with and exclusively license technology to the private sector.
The legal status of a commodity group can affect its ability to take a 
proprietary interest in or license proprietary agricultural technology. For 
instance, federal and state marketing order boards are part of and serve in 
an advisory capacity to their respective departments of agriculture. As a 
result, marketing order boards are not separate legal entities and cannot take 
a proprietary interest in or license technology for commercial use. On the 
other hand, commodity commissions are created by specific legislation to 
perform the same function as marketing order boards but are separate legal 
entities within state governments and therefore can take a proprietary interest 
in or license technology for commercial use.5 &
Where producer groups choose to continue to fund land-grant university 
research, should the university give them a preference in licensing proprietary 
technology generated with such funds?
4For example, a coalition of California dairy industry groups have established a private dairy research 
institute at the California State University at San Luis Obispo.
Recently, some California state marketing orders have restructured as commissions in part to give 
themselves the option of owning or licensing the technology they funded independent of the State 
Department of Food and Agriculture. (See, for example, the Fresh Strawberry Program Act, Cal. F
& Agric. Code §§77401-77505).
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This is a topic of current debate in California. A 1994 report by the California 
Commodity Commission6 criticized the University of California’s intellectual 
property rights and technology transfer policies and questioned the University’s 
commitment to California agriculture:
The university’s preeminent reputation . . . has resulted . . . from its close 
interaction with commercial farmers and from their strong support and coopera-
tion ... A break in this close connection with and clear commitment to California 
agriculture increases the likelihood that technology developed with tax dollars 
or funds provided by private industry, commodity groups and agencies could 
become equally available to competing industries in other states and nations 
(California Commodity Committee 1994).
The report gives examples where new technology developed with state 
commodity program grant money was licensed to an out-of-state competitor 
before the state commodity group knew about the technology. The report 
recommends that the university adopt a policy to ensure that research is 
directed toward developing patents of practical value to California agriculture 
and that groups sponsoring research have preference in licensing and 
partnership agreements. The University is currently reviewing its policies 
with input from California commodity groups.
Conclusion
Identity-preservation is one type of end-use oriented marketing system which is 
changing the structure of modern production agriculture. Intellectual property 
rights play a central role in identity-preserved systems because they allow rights 
holders to reduce investment risk, preserve the identity, and control the use of 
value-added factors in downstream or upstream arenas. Production contracts 
are the main mechanism by which producers will participate in identity- 
preserved systems. Production contracts can reduce risks and offer premium 
prices, but they also can present new risks such as inability to learn the true 
market value of products. Producers may increase returns in identity-preserved 
systems by moving into downstream activities such as processing. Likewise, 
producers may decide to fund the development of identity-preserved varieties 
through research agreements or other strategic alliances with private or public 
organizations. Such activities will add to the need to re-examine the traditional 
relationship between the land-grant university and state agriculture. 6
6This committee represents California commodities that are organized under a marketing order, com-
mission, or a related state or federal commodity marketing program.
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